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Abstract
Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and 2 elections (2001 and
2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context
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electoral process, spending on equipment can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has
a strong impact on the incumbent’s score. In the second round, the incumbent’s vote is affected more
by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics
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1 Introduction
The literature on economic voting has evolved largely from analyses of presidential elections in split
political environments, and tends to devote more attention to lower-level elections which reduces the
problem of small sample sizes in presidential elections. These studies offer new insights into voters’
behavior. There is a growing body of work on subnational elections which shows that politicians have
a significant influence on voters (Aidt et al., 2011), if only because the former’s greater control over the
instruments available at this level. Of particular interest to voters is the way that budgets are split
between investments and operating expenditures and the number of civil servants involved. Kneebone
and McKenzie (2001) show that the repartitioning of budgets is relevant in Canadian Provinces; they use
the term “visible expenditures”. For Portugal, Veiga and Veiga (2007) show that increases in investment
expenditure and changes in the composition of expenditure to favor highly visible types of spending are
associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking reelection. Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho (2008) analyze the influence of public spending on the probability of mayors’ being reelected in
Brazil, and show recording higher levels of expenditure during their term of office increases the probability
of their own reelection or that of a successor from the same political party. The first goal of this research
is to build on this growing literature and to investigate the influence of the local budget structure on
incumbents’ results and reelection prospects in France, based on the French local (municipal) elections
in 2001 and 2008.1
Powell and Whitten (1993) show that the impact of economic conditions on electorates varies among
countries. However, how electoral rules influence economic voting across countries has been largely
ignored by research. This paper highlights that some elections involve two rounds, a feature that is often
not acknowledged but which is raising important theoretical issues, especially in relation to the number
of parties and the role of extremist parties (Bordignon et al., 2010). We consider the econometric and
economic issues this electoral rule induces. Econometrically, if both rounds in an election are considered
as a single election, they should be considered as two separate but intrinsically related electoral processes.
In economic terms, we need to ask whether it is the same set of variables that influences voters in each
round. The French case is interesting given the electoral rule, the multiparty political arena and the
reduced space for strategic maneuvering by politicians. The institutional structure and the fixed election
dates are exogenous (from the perspective of the politician).
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides an empirical methodology
that is designed to take specific account of the specificities of two-round electoral processes, and avoid
the biases that might have affected existing estimates (for France and for other countries with similar
electoral rules). Relying on a linear model estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Heckman-
type procedures, we account for the biases that can arise as a result of selection and endogeneity problems.
After the first election round, the incumbent faces three possibilities (reelection, elimination or running
again in the second round). For incumbents required to run in the second round, there are two possibilities
(as in one-stage elections): reelection or defeat. Considering only the second-round results overlooks the
1In France, there are several layers of local government, regional, departmental and city, each one involving a separate
election. In this paper, we focus on city or municipal elections. In the remainder of the paper, “local” refers to“municipal”.
political dynamics induced by the electoral rule. The second contribution is the inclusion of three types
of data as potential election determinants: budget data, political variables, and an economic context
indicator. These indicators are rarely included in the same estimates but they offer a more complete
modeling of the voter’s decision-making process. This study is the first to provide a comprehensive
view of the two-stage electoral process and to propose an empirical strategy aimed at disentangling the
determinants of voters’ decisions in each round. This paper is more comprehensive than the studies in
the literature.
The results of this analysis contribute to the existing literature at various levels. First, we show that
the electoral rule matters and that voters are aware of this. More specifically, in the French case (dual
ballot under the plurality rule), we reveal that budget variables (in particular, equipment expenditure)
only impact on first-round votes, except in safe seats where, by definition, manipulating budget variables
is less relevant. Second, the second-round votes are mostly determined by national politics (and notably
the “midterm” nature of the election) and by the degree of political competition (number of candidate
from the same and other political parties). Third, although there are some determinants that could lead
to the two rounds being considered as separate elections, we show that they are strongly related to the
dynamics of the first round and strongly impact on the incumbent’s score in the second.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the legal and political contexts to the theoretical
framework and background literature presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the data, and Section
5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses the main empirical results and provides several
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Legal and political environment
The legal and political realities of French local elections differ from the contexts of existing studies in
the field. First, the French political arena is bipartisan. In the sample (described below), there are
many different parties, none of which can be considered marginal. For each election considered, voters
are required to choose among candidates from more than ten political parties. Simple differentiation
between Right and Left is not possible. In the 2001 election, for example, such a differenciation would
have combined the National Front (FN, far right party, leader: Jean-Marie Le Pen) with the Rally for
the Republic (RPR, moderate right, leader: Jacques Chirac). For voters, these parties are different.
Reinforcing this difference, Jacques Chirac rejected any agreement with the FN. In what follows, we
consider separately the role of the far right role in the second round, but classify the opposing candidates
according to a Left-Right distinction.
The legal context for local elections in France evolved over time but was determined in 1982 (and
applied since 1983). Local elections are usually held every six years.2 They apply to communities of at
least 3,500-inhabitants (the voting system is different for smaller towns). As the towns in our samples
have populations above this threshold (see below), we describe the relevant system. Polling is organized
according to published lists, and comprises (possibly) two rounds. The winning list receives half the seats
2Except between 2001 and 2008, when the election was postponed because in that year, there were presidential and
parliamentary elections.
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on the town council; the remaining seats are distributed proportionally across all the lists (including the
winning list) that received more than 5% of the votes. The first-round winning list is the list that received
more than 50% of the votes. If a second round is necessary, the 50% majority threshold no longer holds,
and all the lists with more than 10% of the votes can compete. Also, lists with more than 5% of the votes
can decide to merge between the two rounds. Merging is a consequence of the multipartisan context,
which it reinforces, as electoral law allows lists defeated in the first round to merge with one (or several)
of the runners-up in the second round.
These features (the two-round electoral process and its multipartisan context and the possibility of
merging) are not accounted for simultaneously in the literature on elections in France or in other countries
with comparable systems. This present study is the first to provide a comprehensive view of the two-stage
electoral process and to design an empirical strategy aimed at disentangling the determinants of voters’
decisions in each round.
3 Theoretical background and related literature
We present a stylized model that encompasses the three features of interest: economic voting, influence
of budget on voters, and the impact of the voting rule.
In any jurisdiction i (here, a municipality) the representative voter derives her utility from a local
public goods supply, Oi. The local supply of public goods is a combination of spending on equipment,
gi,e, staff, gi,s, and other spending (functioning), gi,f :
Oi = O (gi,e, gi,s, gi,f ) (1)
where the function O is increasing with each factor. Voters trade off their preferred policy against the
policy implemented by the elected politician. Assuming that each voter, j, has a quasi-linear utility
function, we can write:
U ji,t,1(Oi) = V (Oi,t)−
(
Oji,t,1 − pOIi,t,1 − (1− p)OQi,t,1
)2
(2)
where the subscripts represent the municipality, i, the election year, t, and if and where applicable, the
election round (1 or 2).3 I and Q, respectively, denote the policy that would be chosen by the incumbent
or her electoral competitors should they be elected. The ex-ante first-round probability of election is
equal to p for the incumbent and 1− p for the competitors. Note that the voters’ preferred public goods
supply may (at least partially) depend on the economic context. Hence, the utility is an implicit function
of the economy, making economic voting a reality. Given the electoral rule, the electoral competition is
open to more than one challenger. The model builds on Bordignon et al. (2010) and, as in their paper, for
simplicity, we limit the competition to four candidates. Here, we consider the incumbent plus three other
candidates, Q ∈ {1, 2 and 3}, who are assumed to be keen to take office. But they also have ideological
policy preferences from which voters, in deciding on the candidate closest to their preferences, minimize
3This type of modeling is used, e.g. in Drazen and Eslava (2010).
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the second part of their utility function. In the empirical test below, this framework allows us to account
for political competition. We consider the number of candidates, and differentiate between candidates
from the same political side and those of other political leanings.
Given the possibility of merging between the first and (potential) second rounds, we acknowledge
that candidates may merge their policy platforms to form what Bordignon et al. (2010) call “electoral
cartels” that cannot be dissolved if elected in. Similarly, we assume that cartels contain a maximum of
two members and are composed of candidates with close beliefs. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the incumbent locates between candidates 1 and 2, meaning that Candidate 2 can merge with
either the incumbent or Candidate 3 while Candidate 1 can only form a party with the incumbent. This
realistic assumption captures the fact that cartels are more likely among ideologically closer parties and
that moderate parties can sometimes join forces, although opposing/extremists cannot because the voters
would not support such a merger.
If a second round is necessary, the voter’s utility can be written as follows:
U ji,t,2(Oi) = V (Oi,t)−
(
Oji,t,2 − q′OIi,t,2 − q′′OQi,t,2 − q′′′OMi,t,2
)2
where Oji,t,2 is the voter’s reference point, which the voter revises based on the first-round results
4,
and the qs indicate the probability of the incumbent running alone and winning (q′), of one of the
challengers running alone and winning (q′′) or one of the cartels running and winning (q′′′). The sum of
the three probabilities is 1. Finally, OMi,t,2 is the policy platform chosen by a merger should there be one, in
which case we have M ∈ {1 + I, I + 2, 2 + 3} exploiting the three potential mergers among the politicians
running for office. Our empirical strategy is designed to account for the potential implications of a merger
between lists for the incumbent’s chance of reelection, given the incumbent’s budgetary choices.
This study, therefore, brings together three strands in the voting literature: the standard strand on
economic voting; the more recent one on how budget structure (and particularly “visible expenditures”)
impacts on voters’ choices; and the literature that examines the effects of the electoral rule on the
economics of voting.
The strand on economic voting has its foundations in the contributions of Downs (1957), Key (1966)
and Kramer (1971), and assumes that voters take the economic situation into account. It has been shown
that voters behave retrospectively: that is, they hold incumbent politicians accountable for past and
current (but not prospective) economic outcomes. Alesina and Cukierman’s (1990) and Harrington’s
(1993) models show that, under some uncertainty, voters have to rely on past and current data to form
their expectations. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) confirm the persistence of a strong economic dimension to
the vote.
However, for at least two reasons, this does not mean an absence of partisanship (Grynaviski, 2010).
First, political parties provide voters with benchmarks, which allow voters to save on the costs of in-
formation search. Second, political parties offer politicians a brand, on the basis of which voters form
expectations according to their experience, which explains how voters show partisan attachment (Degan
4This acknowledges that voters may revise their expectation of the future policies to be implemented by the winning
politician(s), as the political supply may have changed from the first to the second round.
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and Merlo, 2009). Partisan voting sometimes leads to a more important motive, the economic one, shown
by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) in the case of American municipalities.
The implications of this field of research for our study are as follows. First, to reflect partisan
considerations, our independent variable is the share of votes obtained in the current election by the
party’s incumbent mayor. If the incumbent does not stand, we consider the candidate from the same
party. Second, we include the results of the last (i.e. previous) presidential election and a variable for
whether the party of the incumbent mayor belongs to the parliamentary majority to test the relationships
that partisan voters can make between different levels of power. Finally, we take account of economic
voting by incorporating an economic indicator variable in all the estimates. We include this economic
dimension in each round k of the election, reflecting its underlying presence in each round utility function,
U ji,t,k.
The literature on the impact of taxes and public spending on electoral outcomes is well established
at the macro level (see, e.g., Eslava, 2010) and shows that elections have an impact on budget handling
(see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2008). Work on lower levels of government is emergent but suggests that
targeted spending can influence voters’ decisions. Brender (2003) shows that capital expenditures favor
outgoing mayors in Israel. Similarly, for a panel of Colombian municipalities, Drazen and Eslava (2010),
show that investment spending increases before an election, and has a positive impact on the incumbent’s
reelection prospects. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) show that capital expenditures and investment are
more apparent to the voter than operating expenses and that they influence the prospects of reelection.
Veiga and Veiga (2007) confirm this result for municipalities in Portugal. Similarly, Sakurai and Menezes-
Filho (2008) analyze the influence of public expenditure on the probability of mayors being reelected in
Brazil, showing that mayors who spend more during their term of office increase the probability of
their own reelection or that of a successor from the same political party. In a study of local Russian
government entities, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal
instruments increases the incumbent’s reelection chances.
Based on this literature and the described theoretical setting, we include the municipal budget struc-
ture (i.e. the incumbent’s budgetary choices, gs) in our estimates. Although the distinction between
different operating expenditures and investment spending is not usually available to researchers, our data
enables this disaggregation and deeper analysis of the issue at stake.5
The third strand of literature is relatively underdeveloped on the empirical side. In a quasi-experimental
study, Blais et al. (2011) show that voting systems have many effects on the presence of candidates in
constituencies and on the strategic nature of voter behavior (psychological effects). These effects are
less influential than the mechanical effects traditionally attributed to the electoral rule relative to the
number of parties (e.g., on the larger number of parties taking part in a proportional system). Blais et
al. (2010) focus specifically on the effects of one- and two-round polls on voters’ strategic behavior (i.e.,
5Vote functions have been studied in the yardstick competition literature which assumes that voters are sensitive to
neighbor cities’ choices. Tests of this hypothesis, in line with the seminal paper by Besley and Case (1995), rely on the
estimation of tax reaction functions, and show its relevance most of the time. For France, Dubois and Paty (2010) show
that voters sanction the incumbent if their own local housing tax is high relative to that in close geographical neighbors,
but they use first round data only. However, this strand of literature does not consider budget expenditure, and including
taxes and expenditures can lead to endogeneity and collinearity problems, especially in the French context. This explains
our focus on expenditure.
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the tendency to vote sincerely or strategically). The authors show that strategic voting is as frequent in
two-round elections as in one-round elections. Bordignon et al. (2010) study the impact of an Italian
electoral reform rule to confirm these effects on the number of parties and the power of extremist parties.
Finally, the empirical study by Kamakura et al. (2006), to our knowledge, is the only attempt to model
a two-round election explicitly. The authors take a different approach to the present study, seeking to
predict the outcome of second-round results based on the first round results, whereas we highlight the
commonalities and differences in vote determinants in each round.
The existing literature is the motivation for an empirical methodology that accounts explicitly for
the existence of two rounds and the relationship between them, as evidenced by the qs in the above
framework. It means also that our estimates integrate data on the political context of the election. First,
we include variables related to the performance of the party of the incumbent mayor: the score in the
last municipal election, and the round in which the incumbent was elected in that previous election. We
then consider the impact of the voting rule by integrating the number of candidates in every electoral
round, the possibility of a merger occurring between the two rounds, and the potential presence of an
extreme right party in the second round. Finally, we consider the electorate’s interest by controlling for
the number of terms of office of the incumbent.
The literature on French local elections includes the study by Martin (1996), who was among the
first to note the fatigue effect of repeated terms and to stress the potentially negative effect of merging
lists between the two-rounds of the election.6 He describes the evolution of vote margins between 1977
and 1995 for the cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. Je´roˆme-Speziari and Je´roˆme (2002) show
the economic motives to be present at the municipal level, and insist on the destabilizing impact of the
far right, especially for the conservative lists, which it hurts more than the Left. However, they look
at whichever is the winning round, for a sample of 236 cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants, for the
1989 and 1995 elections. Gougou (2008) analyzes the political supply in France and the link between
the presidential and the municipal elections since 1983, but considers only 235 cities (again with the
threshold of 30,000 inhabitants). Foucault et al. (2008) test the existence of interactions related to
public expenditures, for the biggest French municipalities (90 cities with over 50,000 inhabitants), using
a dynamic panel dataset covering the period 1983 to 2002. Dubois and Paty (2010) consider the tax side
of the yardstick hypothesis, showing that voters sanction the incumbent if the local tax rate increases,
unless the rate has also increased in neighboring cities. However, their sample is only 104 cities with more
than 50,000 inhabitants. Given the focus of these studies on tax and spending interactions, they do not
investigate the political landscape or the impact of the voting rule. Hence, although not exhaustive, this
brief survey of the literature on French municipal elections shows that there are no studies that provide
a wider geographical coverage or a richer set of determinants, especially in relation to budget variables
and political competition.
In studies of elections in other countries, disaggregated local expenditures and descriptions of the
political context are generally also more limited than ours. Moreover, the specific setting of a two-stage
process for some municipal elections is never clearly accounted for. This paper tries to fill some of these
6See Dubois (2007) for a general survey of the literature on vote functions in France. Auberger (2004) focuses on
Presidential elections.
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gaps.
4 Data and variables
4.1 Sample representativeness
At city level, spending data are available for the period 2000-2009, which includes the 2001 and 2008
elections. For both these years, we consider primarily municipalities with over 10,000-inhabitants. How-
ever, in some rural departments7, the biggest cities in the department are less than 10,000. In these
cases, we include the biggest cities in the department, in order to have all metropolitan departments
represented in the sample. This is made possible because several French newspapers, at election time,
provide information that allows the construction of some important explanatory variables used in this
study (especially, incumbent’s share of votes in the first round of the previous election and the incumbent
party’s share of votes in the presidential election, see below).8
The final and main sample includes 821 cities covering both the 2001 and 2008 elections, which account
for approximately half the French voting population. Our sample represents all French departments
(except overseas territories). Overall, our sample is consistent in terms of legal rules, and the time period
is sufficiently short to assume that the main determinants of electoral behavior have not varied much
over the period (Cautre`s, 2004). This makes our sample one of the biggest and the most representative
in the voting literature in general, and in studies of French voting in particular9. Similar to Ferreira
and Gyourko (2009), Table 1 column (1) reports the means and standard deviations (in parentheses)
for some key variables for our sample for the year 2007. Because we are interested in our main sample
being representative, Table 1 reports analogous information on different samples/sub-samples. Table 1
column (2) presents data on cities with populations of over 10,000 inhabitants. The figures are very
similar to those in column (1). More relevant is how representative our sample is of smaller French cities
(3,500-10,000 inhabitants, see column (3)) and an expanded sample that includes all cities with more
than 3,500 population (column(4)). Given our 10,000 population cut-off, it is not surprising that the
cities in our sample are more populous than the average French city. But our final sample is comparable
to the sample presented in column (3) in many ways. The shares of reelected incumbents are similar, and
the scores of incumbents are also of the same order of magnitude. Even more striking is the similarity
in income levels. Whether considering income per capita or median income, they are very similar, and
for the income per capita, the difference is not significant.10 Turning to local budgets, equipment and
operating expenditure are also very comparable, only staff spending appears to be significantly higher in
the biggest cities, which can be explained by legal constraints (see below). Overall, our sample can be
7In France, department is a geographically defined area which functions as an administrative unit at the provincial level.
8For other cities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, it was difficult to retrieve information for 2008, and was impossible
for 2001 (some has still not been digitized, and the French Ministry of Internal Affairs does not provide information from
paper archives).
9E.g., Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) investigate the importance of political parties for a sample of 413 cities; Dubois and
Paty (2010) test the existence of yardstick competition for a sample of 104 French cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants;
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) study fiscal policy and reelection in a panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities.
All these studies are based on a sample of all existing municipalities. A nice exception is Martins and Veiga (2011), who
analyze economic voting over all 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities.
10The null of equality cannot be rejected at the 10% level, t-stat equals 1.49 and p-value equals 0.134
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considered representative of the whole population of cities with over 3,500 inhabitants. This is confirmed
by the estimations presented in Section 6.
[Table 1 about here]
4.2 Dependent variable
The observed variable is the electoral result of the incumbent mayor’s party, that is, the incumbent
party’s vote share. If the incumbent mayor does not stand for reelection, we consider the candidate of
the same party as the incumbent. This captures partisan effects because we want to explain the party
result not the individual result. The underlying theory is in line with Hibbs (1977), who hypothesizes
that politicians adopt policies that find favor with their supporters. Powell and Whitten (1993) and
Swank (1993) also introduce partisan effects into the literature on voter behavior.
Partisan endorsements are the variable of interest here. The underlying rationale is that the en-
dorsements allow investigation of the combined influence of partisanship, incumbency, and economic
performance (assessed here based on expenditures) on election results, and without noise from individual
characteristics. The continuing attachment of most voters to one or another political party has been
noted since Campbell et al. (1960) and has been confirmed empirically and theoretically (see, e.g., Degan
and Merlo, 2009). Given the French political and legal systems, we have an opportunity to test the
influence of endorsement by political parties on voter behavior. Bartels and Brady (2003) insist on the
need to account for this dimension, and Gerber and Hopkins (2011) show its relevance at the municipal
level for discretionary spending, bringing a nuance to the conclusion in Ferreira and Gyurko (2009) of
the stronger impact of economic voting compared to partisanship effects.
Considering parties’ voter shares to account for partisan effects avoids a resort to partisan effect
dummies because our dependent variable includes this information. We do not ignore the fact that a
charismatic incumbent can help her party, and this effect is accounted for in our empirical strategy.
In particular, we consider the candidates biographical data, for example, whether she is a Minister, a
Deputy or a Senator, to account for national reputation, and if she was directly elected in the preceding
election, to account for personal charisma (see below for the implementation strategy). As stated above,
the electoral context is multipartisan, which may dilute the partisan effect. To account for this possibility,
the explanatory variables include the number of candidates from the same side of the political spectrum
(Left or Right), to deal with multipartisanship (see more detail below).
Given the electoral process, we explicitly examine two shares of votes, one obtained by the incumbent
candidate, i, in the first round and one obtained by the incumbent candidate, i, in the second ballot
when she must run again in the second round.
4.3 First set of explanatory variables: Budget data
Because politicians can use the budget structure to influence elections, an initial data set includes budget
data at city level (similar to Veiga and Veiga, 2007 and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008). Budget data
are available from the French Data Census of the Ministry of Finance for the period 2000-2009. We
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consider a set of budget variables, Ui, with four items: staff costs, operating expenditures excluding staff
costs, equipment spending and debt. These variables are expressed per capita.11
Operating expenditures excluding staff costs, and debt should have a negative impact on the dependent
variable if perceived as a manifestation of bad government. Conversely, spending on new equipment should
have a positive impact on the dependent variable. The significance of the coefficient of staff spending is
less clear. High staff spending, similar to other operating costs, can be interpreted as bad government,
but more staff spending can also entail more jobs or higher wages, increasing voters’ welfare (or simply
buying votes). It is interesting to identify empirically which effect dominates, especially as our preferred
sample includes large cities, where it might be assumed that the first effect would dominate the second.
This would be even more interesting since French municipalities act under relatively strict (national) rules
regarding the hiring of civil servants. The ratio of higher-paid to lower-paid staff is determined by the
municipality’s size; however, municipalities can circumvent the rule by hiring under short-term contracts.
Staff costs are an indicator of how the party in power manages under this constraint.
Finally, we use first-lagged values so that the variables remain consistent with the timing of the
elections, which take place in March or April. At that time, voters know only about the effectiveness of
the budget in the preceding year. The underlying hypothesis of backward-looking behavior among voters
is consistent with the literature on economic voting.
4.4 Second set of explanatory variables: Political variables
We include a large set of political variables, which fall into three subgroups. First we consider variables
related to the specific situation of the incumbent (Φi). For the first round estimations, we include the
incumbent party’s share of the vote in the last municipal election. Dubois and Paty (2010) show that the
previous local vote may be an expression of long-term strength or voter inertia, since many voters vote
the same way from one election to the next. As a result, the expected sign for this variable is positive.
This variable can also be considered a proxy for sociodemographic determinants (religious practice, age,
and occupation). Dummies for the incumbent’s national standing are included and are equal to 1 if she is
a minister, a deputy or a senator, and 0 otherwise. Another method for examining past electoral results
is to introduce a dummy equal to 1 if the mayor was elected in the first round in the last election and
0 otherwise. We expect a positive sign of all the variables because they represent incumbent-specific
features, which may favor reelection. Finally, we introduce a duration variable (defined as the number of
consecutive mandates implemented by the incumbent mayor) and its square to check for non-linearities
in the duration phenomenon. This variable can be considered a proxy for experience (positive) but also
as a measure of voter fatigue (negative). During her first term, the current mayor could profit from a
”honeymoon” effect, favoring easier reelection than in the case of a candidate from the same party who
lacks experience. During the additional terms, voter fatigue, erosion of power and more familiarity with
the mayor’s preferences may be harmful to reelection prospects.
Most of these regressors are applied in the second round, with two exceptions. First, the mayor’s share
11This distinction among budget variables in four categories is generally used in communications from municipalities to
local journals and thus is familiar to voters.
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of votes in the previous election is replaced by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent received the
highest vote share in the first round and equal to 0 otherwise. Including this variable helps to capture the
dynamics inherited from the first round, with an expected positive sign. Second, the duration variables
are used as selection variables in our empirical strategy for the second round (section 5.3 below). Indeed,
correct implementation of the two-step Heckman selection procedure requires, for identification purposes,
the inclusion in the selection equation of at least one variable which does not influence the main equation
(Wooldridge 2002). The number of consecutive mandates and its square satisfy these conditions.
The second subgroup of political variables (Ωi) addresses the intensity of the electoral competition.
As already indicated, all candidates whose scores in the first round are higher than 10% of the total vote
qualify to stand in the second round, and the winner is the candidate who receives the highest percentage
of votes. Depending on the first-round results, more than two candidates may stand in the second round
(see Table 2 below).
[Table 2 about here]
Another interesting feature of the multipartisan political context is that the incumbent party may be
damaged by candidates from other parties located on the same side of the political spectrum (Left or
Right). According to Fauvelle-Aymar and Franc¸ois (2006), an increase in the number of candidates leads
to a vote dispersion which penalizes the incumbent, and it could be argued that this dispersion effect
may be quantitatively different depending whether the other candidates are from the same wing (Left
or Right) as the incumbent or from the opposite wing. In both rounds, we distinguish the number of
candidates belonging to the incumbent’s wing and the number of candidates belonging to the opposing
wing. Due to the dispersion effect, we expect a negative sign of these variables.
For the second round, we add two regressors to address the possibility that lists with more than
5% of the votes may merge between rounds. The first regressor takes the value 1 if the incumbent
merges with one or several lists, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the second regressor takes the value of
1 if the potential competitors merge (with one or several other lists) and 0 otherwise. Merging can
have a positive impact on the incumbent’s share of votes because it widens the incumbent’s electorate
reach. Conversely, this variable could display a negative sign because the merger reflects the incumbent’s
weakness and incapacity to win on her own. The reasoning is similar for merging competing lists: the
sign will be negative if the merger of rival lists increases popularity, also positive if the merger leads to an
inconsistent or too wide group, de facto benefiting the incumbent party. As a consequence, the signs of
the variables for mergers are a priori unknown and must be empirically settled. To analyze the intensity
of second-round competition, a dummy variable accounts for the presence of the far-right party (FN) in
the second round and its potentially disruptive effects on the incumbent’s results. Because we do not
know ex ante which of the two effects will dominate, the sign of this variable must be settled empirically.
The third subgroup of political variables (χi) accounts for the links between the local and national
political contexts. We include a dummy equal to 1 if the incumbent mayor and the majority in Parliament
are from the same political party and 0 if not. This variable controls for the potential influence exerted
by the government’s popularity in local elections. French voters commonly consider municipal elections
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as mid-terms and use them to penalize government and the parliamentary majority; we expect a negative
sign of this variable. We use a variable to control for the vote share received by presidential candidate
from the incumbent mayor’s party, in the second round of the last presidential election.12 In our sample,
the relevant elections were the 1995 and 2007 presidential elections. Logically, the sign for this variable
should be positive because it has been shown for France that the incumbent benefits from the vote share
of parties close to her own, obtained in the second round of the previous national elections (see, e.g.,
Dubois and Paty, 2010).
4.5 Third set of explanatory variables: economic control
We follow Peltzman’s (1987) argument that voters consider local economic performance. As in much of
the literature we use personal income: we use the municipal gross personal income per capita (Yi). The
expected sign is positive, because increasing personal income per capita indicates local economic success
for the incumbent.13
Table 3 summarizes the data sources, the definitions of our variables and the expected signs of the
related parameters; Table 4 provides summary statistics for the main sample.
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
5 Empirical methodology
5.1 General setting
Accounting for different political variables and the economic context, we study the effect of budget
structure and electoral rule on the incumbent party’s share of the votes. Including these variables makes
our model more complete than those in the existing literature and allows us to disentangle their relative
impact in each round of the election process.
In the first round of the election, the incumbent faces three possibilities: receiving enough (more than
10%) votes to run again in the second ballot; receiving less than 10% of the votes in the first round and
not competing in the second round; and having more than 50% of the votes and being directly reelected.
On average, in the two elections considered (2001 and 2008), 48.7% of the incumbents were in a “run
again” position; 3.7% were defeated, and 47.5% were reelected.
For the first round, the impact of the set of explanatory variables described above on the incumbent’s
share of votes can be estimated by this standard linear equation:
INC1i = αUi + βΦi + γΩi + δχi + ζYi + c+ εi (3)
where i is the municipality. We estimate a similar equation for a second round, if needed:
12If the mayor of municipality i is from the right, we report the result for the right wing candidate in the municipality in
the presidential election, and vice-versa.
13One could argue that the unemployment rate would be a relevant variable. However, it is almost never significant in
the literature, a finding confirmed in our case by preliminary results.
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INC2i = θUi + ϑΦi + κΩi + ρχi + τYi + c+ εi (4)
5.2 General econometric issues
Our dependent variables show the ratio of number of votes for the incumbent’s party and the total
valid votes. Behind this share of votes is a binary choice “to vote or not to vote for the incumbent’s
party”. This consists of the proportion, Pi, of the ni individuals who vote for the incumbent’s party
(and give a vote equal to 1 for the incumbent’s party and 0 for all other parties). As Greene (2008)
suggests, equations 3 and 4 could be estimated with grouped data estimation techniques using a weighted
least squares probit procedure for grouped data. However, in our setting, there is no need to estimate
individual-level parameters. The only goal is a reasonable model for the dependent variable p, lying
between 0 and 1. Then, a linear regression with a logistic transformation is appropriate: if r is the vote
share in any round, then R = log(r/(100-r)) is the logistic transformation.14 As Cameron and Trivedi
(2005) emphasize, the errors will be heteroskedastic: therefore, we use White heteroskedastic robust
standard errors. Also, the structure of our data means we have the problem of error clustering. It is
expected that the observable and unobservable characteristics of the cities are correlated (cf. Moulton,
1986, 1990). In addition to the standard White correction for heteroskedasticity, we correct for city-
level error correlation using the Froot (1989) correction. Finally, in order to ensure that the normality
of residuals is achieved in our preferred sample, we introduce a dummy variable in the second round
estimates that is equal to 1 if the dependent variable (the incumbent party’s share of votes in the second
round) is higher or lower than three times its standard deviation.
To check for potential multicollinearity among regressors, we compute the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) for each regressor. The VIF shows how the presence of multicollinearity inflates estimator variance.
The larger the VIF value, the more collinear the variables. A common rule is to consider a VIF exceeding
10 as an indicator of high collinearity of the considered variable (Gujarati, 2004). For all our variables,
the VIF, on average, is 2.40 for equation 3 and 1.37 for equation 415, confirming that our estimates do
not suffer from multicollinearity problems.
As indicated by the notations, equations 3 and 4 are cross-sectionally estimated separately for each
year (2001 and 2008). With only two years, a panel estimation would not make much sense. The
importance of the differences between these two sets of estimates will give us valuable information on the
relative importance of the determinants listed above. Moreover, the political contexts of each election
are very different. The 2001 election was held one year before the presidential election and took place
under a divided government (termed “cohabitation” in French, i.e., the President and the Prime Minister
were from different parties, the latter being the leader of the majority in the Assembly), whereas the
2008 election took place one year after a presidential election the result of which was confirmed during
the subsequent legislative election. Thus, the government was not divided after 2007, but the 2008
election offered the electorate its first opportunity to sanction the national executive and therefore can
14For the same reason, a logit transformation is made on the vote share the incumbent party received in the preceding
municipal election.
15Complete results of the VIF tests available upon request.
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be considered a midterm election. Because some of our variables do not have a clear theoretical sign, it
is interesting to look at both elections separately to uncover differences that might remain hidden were
the data pooled.
One can think system-estimation methods (e.g., Three-Stage Least squares or Full Information Max-
imum Likelihood) as appropriate ones for the joint estimation of equations 3 and 4. In our case, their
application is not straightforward, because it leads to estimations based on roughly half of our main sam-
ple and excludes cities where de facto no second round takes place, because the incumbent wins directly
in the first round. Since they can be understood as a non-random selection, we choose not to rely on
such estimates, which could be flawed by systematic bias. We designed different empirical methodologies
to account for the two rounds of the electoral process, and the dynamics they produce.
5.3 Econometric issues specific to each round
For the first round, estimations are performed using OLS. Here, the specific issue is the number of
incumbents reelected in the first round. We provide estimates for this sub-sample of incumbents to
highlight specific factors that may explain their success relative to other observations in the sample. As
the first-round winners, by definition, have received more than 50% of the votes, our analysis requires a
censored Tobit-type estimation based on a left-censoring limit of 50% (i.e. 50% of the vote is equivalent
to a logit-transformed proportion equal to 0).16
Estimation concerns are not so straightforward for specification 4. A simple OLS estimation for
equation 4 may be affected by a potential selection bias from the first-round results. We rely on the
Heckman two-stage estimation procedure to correct for potential selection bias. We use as city-level
selection variables the number of consecutive mandates implemented by the incumbent and the square
of this number. Because of the erosion of power and voter fatigue effects, these variables consistently
influence the probability of running again in the second round (the selection equation) but do not influence
the share of votes (specification 4, see Wooldridge 2002, for more details).17 As shown below, there is no
evidence of selection.
There is an obvious issue of reverse causality in the dependent variable at the second round (the share
of votes) with the possibility for the incumbent to merge with other lists. The expected share of votes
for the incumbent in the second round clearly influences the probability of merging. In statistical terms,
endogeneity arises because a merger for the incumbent’s list is correlated with the error term in the vote
function equation. In this context, a treatment effect model is adequate: it simultaneously estimates
equations for the likelihood of treatment (merging lists) and the outcome of the treatment (share of votes
received by the incumbent). We construct a second set of estimates, including the variable representing
a merger of the incumbent with competing lists, based on a treatment effect model using the Heckman
selection estimator. We first obtain predicted values for the merger variable through a probit estimation
(treatment effect equation)18, and include these predicted values as additional regressors in equation 4
(see, among others, Winship and Mare, 1992; Vella and Verbeek, 1999, Blundell and Costas Dias, 2000).
16Note that the right-censoring limit of 100% is already taken into account in the logit transformation.
17All estimates including the selection variables are available upon request.
18Complete results are available upon request from the authors.
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In addition to the regressors in equation 4, we include a number of variables in the treatment equation
that are likely to affect a merger. We include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent
is the incumbent mayor and 0 if not (incumbents are likely to experience more difficulty to be reelected
when they are not known to the electorate). We also include a gender dummy (1 if the incumbent is a
woman and 0 if not) and the log of the municipal population.
6 Empirical evidence
Estimation results for equations 3 and 4 are shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7. All specifications were first
estimated on our main sample and then on a subsample restricted to incumbents who are also the mayor.
This is a simple and direct test for the potential charisma effects mentioned previously. For comparison, we
provide results for the incumbents who were reelected in the first round. We provide separate estimates for
2001 and 2008. For 2008, we provide a double set of estimates: one is performed on our main sample, the
other on an enlarged sample of cities with a population of over 3,500 inhabitants19. For 2008, results based
on our sample and results based on the expanded sample are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very
similar in almost all cases. This provides substantial evidence that our preferred sample reproduces almost
perfectly the features of the whole populations of cities with over 3,500 inhabitants, and therefore can be
considered fully representative. For each estimation, we also report the Jarque-Bera statistic for normality
and the associated p-value. Under the null, the Jarque-Bera statistic has a Chi-square distribution with
two degrees of freedom. For all estimates but one on the main sample, the null of normality cannot be
rejected at the 5% level (or even the 10% in most cases). For estimates on the enlarged sample, the
null of normality is systematically rejected for the first round estimates, however. Therefore, we check
the robustness of our inference by performing additional estimates based on bootstrapping techniques.20
The bootstrapped standard errors are very close to the conventional ones, supporting the reliability of
conventional estimates for the expanded sample.
6.1 First round
Table 5, columns (a) and (b) give the results for the main sample (incumbent mayors and party incumbent)
for the first round, and column (c) presents the estimates for the enlarged sample. Staff costs have a
positive impact on the incumbent’s share of the votes, supporting the idea that voters consider this to be
more useful spending than standard operating expenditures. As expected, debt and operating costs reduce
the share of the votes, but operating costs are never significant. Spending on equipment also appears to
be valued by voters. Voters’ awareness of the budget structure confirms earlier results on Portugal and
Brazil. In 2001, equipment spending and political variables seem to be the main determinants of the
incumbent’s share of votes (see below). This could be linked to 2001 election occurring one year before
a presidential election, compared to the 2008 municipal elections which occurred after the presidential
election.
19The logit transformation of the dependent variables and missing data for some cities leaves us with a total of 801
observations for 2001, 812 for 2008 (main sample), and 2,247 for the enlarged sample.
20More details of these alternative estimates are available upon request to the authors.
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[Table 5 about here]
Political variables generally have an impact on the incumbent’s vote share. Past local elections play
a role in the reelection process. The higher the share of the past vote, the higher the present vote
share (highlighting a strong incumbency premium). If the mayor was elected in the first round in the
past, she will receive more votes in the current election. There is some evidence of non-linearity in the
duration variable. In 2008, the number of consecutive mandates had a positive and significant impact
on the incumbent’s vote share. Interestingly, after a certain number of terms, the “honeymoon” effect
ends (the square of the duration variable has a negative impact on the share of votes). In other words,
voter fatigue, the erosion of power and better knowledge of the mayor’s preferences reduce the incumbent
mayor’s vote share. Finally, being a minister does not generate votes, whereas deputies and, to a lesser
extent, senators (but only in 2001) attract significantly more votes. These three variables signal to voters
national competence and, potentially, the incumbent’s ability to obtain government grants for local pet
projects based on her networks. It appears also that voters fear that a national representative, such as a
minister, will be less available to devote time to managing the city, and these fears offset the reputation
effect.
The number of competing candidates from the same or the opposite wing has a negative impact on
the incumbent’s vote share, confirming the results in Fauvelle-Aymar and Franc¸ois (2006): an increase
in the number of candidates leads to vote dispersion which penalizes all the candidates, including the
incumbent. Dispersion in the candidate’s wing is even more prejudicial to the incumbent than dispersion
in the opposite wing. The Wald test rejects the null of equality between the estimated parameters for
the number of candidates in the first round from the same wing and from the opposite wing. In other
words, the parameter of the number of candidates from the same wing is higher (in absolute value) than
the parameter of the number of candidates in the opposite wing. Dispersion is more harmful to the
incumbent in her own wing than in the opposite wing. This result holds regardless of the year (election),
the round considered or whether the incumbent is the current mayor.21 The only exception is when the
incumbent is elected in the first round. In this case, dispersion in her wing and in the opposite wing seem
equally harmful.
The dummy variable for the incumbent from the leading parliamentary coalition is strongly signifi-
cant and shows up negatively for 2008, adding weight to the view that voters seized the first electoral
opportunity to send a message of discontent to the national majority. Other studies on French elections
report this effect (see, e.g., Auberger and Dubois, 2005, who analyze reciprocal local-national influences
on legislative elections). In 2001, the coefficient is positive, but not significant at the 5% level. The
national political context, marked by “cohabitation” between a Right-wing president and a Left-wing
leading coalition in parliament, might explain this result. These results accord with the theory of second
order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Norris and Reif, 1997), according to which a government’s pop-
ularity decreases year on year. This trend results from government implementing unpopular measures at
the beginning of its mandates and implementing measures to increase the probability of reelection at the
end of its mandate. Results of second order elections, such as municipal elections, are determined strongly
21Details of all equality tests for the second round available upon request.
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by the timing of municipal elections in the national cycle, and as explained above, this timing was very
different for the two elections we consider. The share of votes in the presidential election confirms the
expected positive sign, supporting the fact that (national) partisanship matters.
When comparing the results for 2001 and 2008 (columns (a) and (b)/(c)), the political variables affect
voter behavior in 2001 but not the budget variables (except equipment spending, which has a low level
of significance). In this election, political and ideological concerns predominate over the incumbent’s
spending policy, in voters’ decisions.
We perform the estimates on elections in which the incumbent is the current mayor (columns (c)
and (d) for the main sample, column (e) for the enlarged sample). While almost all the signaled effects
remain unchanged between the two subsamples (management of public funds, dispersion effects induced
by the increased number of candidates, presence of an incumbency premium), there is one difference: the
non-linear effect of time in office is significant when we consider the entire sample, but it is less (2001) or
not (2008) significant when the current mayor is a candidate. As our dependent variable is the incumbent
party’s share of votes in the former case, the results can be interpreted as meaning that the fatigue effect
is related more to political parties than to people, which would confirm the trend towards lower partisan
bonds across voters (Kayzer and Wlezien, 2011).
In the third step, we focus on the share of the vote when the incumbent was reelected in the first
round (columns (e) and (f) for the main sample, column (g) for the enlarged sample). With the exception
of spending on equipment, no major change is observed when comparing with the whole sample. When
equipment spending increases, it increases the vote share of all incumbents except those reelected in the
first round. This might suggest that directly reelected incumbents can consider their seats to be safe,
which reduces the incentive to use the budget strategically. Equipment spending remains significant for
the enlarged sample, however: in that case, the interpretation converges to the one mentioned above.
6.2 Second round
Table 6 below presents a set of estimates for equation 4 based on the Heckman two-step selection proce-
dure, for the second round.
[Table 6 about here]
It can be seen that the Mills ratio is insignificant in all the estimates, providing strong evidence of the
absence of selection. The estimates are similar to those presented in Table 7 which include an endogenous
dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the incumbent list merges with competing lists.
[Table 7 about here]
These results are based on a treatment effect model that simultaneously estimates the likelihood that
the incumbent merges her list between the two rounds, and the second round vote share, controlling for
the merger’s potential endogeneity (see above). The Mills ratio, computed from the fitted values of the
treatment equation, is significant in 2001 (main sample) and 2008 (expanded sample). This provides
strong support for the existence of self-selection in mergers and the relevance of a treatment effect model.
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Interestingly, the results show that some variables with a significant impact on vote share in the first
round lose their significance in the second round, especially the budget variables. Some political variables
that mattered in the first round also lose their influence in the second round. Being elected in the first
round in the previous election does not exert a positive influence on the incumbent’s share of votes in
the second round. The statistical significance of the share of votes in the presidential election is also
much reduced, disappearing almost completely in Table 7, revealing a dilution in the partisan effects
between the two rounds. Conversely, the midterm effect on the municipal elections is even more visible
than in the first round because belonging to the leading coalition in parliament now exerts a negative
and significant impact in the specifications for both elections, whatever the sample considered. Similarly,
the incumbent’s vote share is reduced more by the number of candidates from the same wing than from
the opposing wing, and the negative effect of vote dispersion persists in the second round with a stronger
impact when competition from the incumbent’s own wing increases.
The possibility of opposite lists merging between the two rounds negatively affects the incumbent’s
score in most specifications: as expected, a merger of competitors generates stronger adversaries, depress-
ing the incumbent result. Also, the treatment effect model in Table 7 shows a statistically significant
negative effect of mergers made by the incumbent on her 2008 vote share, for both the whole sample
(column (c)) and the subsample where the incumbent mayor is a candidate (column (f)). To evaluate
whether or not this treatment effect is causal, the estimated expectations (conditional on the occurrence
of the treatment) are averaged across the sample and differentiated, which allows us to estimate the
average treatment effect across the whole sample. We obtain a significantly positive value for the aver-
age treatment effect in 2001 (main sample) and 2008 (enlarged sample), suggesting that the incumbents
would have received more votes had they not merged with other lists between the two rounds. When
the incumbent decides to merge her list with competing ones, the share of votes obtained in the second
round decreases more or less strongly. This suggests that the incumbent could get more votes were she
to run alone, and provides evidence that the merger shrinks rather than widens the basis for support.
To account for the dynamics between the two rounds, we introduce a dummy equal to 1 when the
incumbent came first in the first round. We obtain a positive and highly significant effect on the vote
share, suggesting that the result of the second round is determined strongly by the first round. It is much
easier for a candidate to win in the second round if she came first in the first round.
Overall, these results show that local management of the incumbent and economic considerations
(gross income per capita is also much less systematically significant than in the first round) play a much
smaller role in the second round. Specific political factors, related to strategic considerations at the local
level (number of candidates and merger of lists), are stronger determinant. In national politics, only the
midterm negative effect seems to persist in the second round, which shows the importance of considering
the two rounds of an election when mandated by the electoral rule.
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6.3 Robustness checks
Finally, we checked the robustness of our results to various alternative specifications.22 As stated above,
French municipalities are constrained by strict rules on staff hiring, which are defined in relation to the
size of the cities (statistically known as “strates”). The robustness check we implement is designed to
compare each city according to the category of its “strate” average. Our results are unaffected by the
introduction of the ratio of local spending on the corresponding average for the city’s “strate”, rather
than considering the level of local spending. The results are qualitatively identical and, if anything, the
difference between the first and the second round is even more dramatic with the budget variables being
generally insignificant. We test also a specification that includes the incumbent’s margin in the second
round estimations rather than her position (captured by a dummy variable in our main results). The
underlying idea being tested is that being first after the first round may not help the incumbent win if
the margin with the nearest competitor is narrow. As expected, we show that the higher the incumbent’s
margin, the higher the vote share at the end of the second round. Our estimates reveal that a negative
margin in the first round acts as negative shock on the vote share. Interestingly, a standard equality test
indicates that the coefficient of the positive margin is significantly lower than the coefficient (in absolute
values) of the negative margin. A negative margin will have a greater effect on the incumbent’s result
than a positive one. The other results are qualitatively unchanged. Finally, on statistical grounds, all
estimates over the main sample are robust to bootstrapping techniques.
7 Conclusion
Using a new database on French municipalities, we studied the determinants of voters’ choices in the
2001 and 2008 local elections, accounting for the two-round structure of the competition. We showed
first that the electoral rule matters. More specifically, in the French case (dual ballot under the plurality
rule), we reveal that the budget variables (and especially equipment expenditures) affect voting in the
first round, except in safe seats where manipulating the budget variables is less relevant. Second, the
second-round votes are determined more by national political considerations (and notably the midterm
nature of the election) and by the degree of political competition (number of candidates from the same
political side and from the other side). Third, although different determinants can lead to considering
the two rounds as separate elections, we show that they are strongly related, with the dynamics of the
first round strongly impacting on the incumbent’s score in the second.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of local spending policies and economic and po-
litical determinants on voters’ behavior and emphasizes the importance of accounting for the specificities
of the electoral rule. It offers a more complete model of voters’ decision-making processes.
22All robustness tables are available upon request to the authors.
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Table 1: Sample representativeness
Main sample Population Population Population
>10,000 >3,500 & >3,500
<10,000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of cities 821 794 1723 2543
Population 31293.83 32064.62 5714.34 13962.55
(36696.57) (37039.66) (1684.66) ( 24058.27)
Political variables
Share of incumbents reelected 79.9 79.6 76.3 77.4
Incumbent score, 1st round 52.48 51.34 57.25 55.39
(14.29) (14.36) (19.53) (18.20)
Incumbent score, 2nd round 47.13 47.14 43.35 45.00
(8.52) (8.61) (9.96) (9.54)
Income variables (2007)
Income (euros per capita) 12733.18 12789.29 12964.01 12889.58
(3772.46) (3804.56) (3308.05) (3465.54)
Median Income (euros) 16599.81 16658.38 17142.34 16967.4
(3749.37) (3777.34) (3424.44) (3540.84)
Local spending (euros per capita)
Equipment 363.66 362.94 381.61 375.82
(196.67) (195.73) (251.43) (235.28)
Wages 619.68 624.05 424.61 487.51
(187.95) (188.02) (193.33) (212.17)
Operating 273.61 275.14 234.89 247.37
(108.12) (109.27) (128.19) (123.39)
Note: Main figures are means. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2: Repartition of the number of candidates opposing the incumbent
First round Second round
Number of candidates Same party not same Same party Other
2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008
0 0 0.4 3.2 3.3 51.5 57.5 52.1 59.3
1 37.3 36.2 49.2 42.1 23.3 22.5 36.6 32
2 35 37.6 29.4 35.3 22.3 18 10.5 7.4
3 17.4 17.3 13.1 14.1 2.6 1.8 0.7 0.6
4 6.5 6.3 3.3 3.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.1
5 2.5 2.1 1 1.4 0 0 0 0
6 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 0 0 0 0
>6 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
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